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A One-Two Punch: How Qualified Immunity’s Double Dose of 
Reasonableness Dooms Excessive Force Claims in the Fourth Circuit* 
Qualified immunity shields government officials from lawsuits alleging they 
violated a person’s constitutional rights. Under the doctrine, if an official can 
show his actions did not violate clearly established law, then he is protected from 
liability. But though its purpose purports to protect officials who make tough 
choices in close calls, its function proceeds more harshly. Despite decades of 
criticism, qualified immunity has only become a sturdier defense under the 
Supreme Court’s direction. The Court has steadily heightened a plaintiff’s 
burden to demonstrate clearly established law, as well as hinted at narrowing 
the playing field of where clearly established law may originate. This Recent 
Development highlights a 2018 excessive force case out of the Fourth Circuit that 
illustrates these very problems; a young girl’s personal autonomy was violated, 
but the officer’s actions were nonetheless protected by qualified immunity. 
Despite the result, this case illustrates where a path forward could be taken that 
would counter qualified immunity’s one-two punch in excessive force claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
When life or death is on the line, we expect law enforcement’s actions to 
be guided by their training and not by fear of a budding lawsuit. Potential 
liability might distract government officials from performing their duties and, 
accordingly, the law protects reasonable mistakes through qualified immunity. 
But what happens when the specificity required to overcome a qualified 
immunity defense is inherently unobtainable for plaintiffs? 
That is the hurdle faced by many Fourth Amendment claimants under 
today’s qualified immunity standards, as demonstrated in E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. 
Dolgos,1 a 2018 Fourth Circuit decision. No life or death was on the line there; 
instead, a school resource officer, accompanied by two adults, handcuffed a 
compliant ten-year-old girl because of a fight that happened three days prior.2 
The girl’s mother subsequently sued the officer for use of excessive force.3 
Although the Fourth Circuit found the officer had indeed violated E.W.’s 
constitutional rights, it held those rights were not clearly established by law; 
therefore, the officer was protected by qualified immunity and the plaintiff was 
left without recourse.4 
 
 *  © 2020 Caroline H. Reinwald. 
 1. 884 F.3d 172 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 2. Id. at 176. 
 3. Id. E.W.’s mother brought the suit on behalf of E.W. Id. at 177. 
 4. Id. at 186–87. 
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Few bright-line rules exist in Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, 
which makes proving the violations of rights difficult.5 Rather, these cases are 
analyzed through a fact-bound reasonableness test that inevitably varies case by 
case.6 For E.W., a successful challenge of the officer’s qualified immunity 
defense depended on her ability to find other cases that specifically defined “the 
contours of her right” to show that a reasonable officer would have known they 
were violating it.7 But over time, the Supreme Court has demanded more and 
more specificity in “clearly established law.” Because each excessive force case 
involves its own particular set of facts, a plaintiff is often unable to find a case 
specific enough to her own factual circumstances to prove there was clearly 
established law showing an officer’s actions would be unconstitutional. 
Consequently, qualified immunity remains lethal to the claims of many 
plaintiffs in fact-driven suits like E.W.’s, and the Supreme Court’s recent 
jurisprudence has only exacerbated the inherent issue. First, the Court has failed 
to resolve a circuit split as to what constitutes clearly established law, instead 
muddying the waters by bringing into question case law many believed settled.8 
Second, the Court continues to narrow the window of specificity for a 
constitutional right established in a previous case.9 
This Recent Development will analyze how the Fourth Circuit’s holding 
of a constitutional violation in E.W., while laudable, might fail to impact future 
plaintiffs faced with immunity defenses in today’s qualified immunity doctrine. 
The Fourth Circuit sits in the middle of a split among circuits as to what creates 
“clearly established law,”10 and this Recent Development argues it is time for 
the Supreme Court to address that split and to rein itself in on the specificity 
requirements it has steadily been heightening. 
Part I of this analysis will discuss the development of qualified immunity 
and excessive force claims, along with recent criticism facing the qualified 
immunity doctrine. Part II will present the facts and holding of E.W. Part III 
will show how E.W. is emblematic of a larger problem with qualified immunity 
and evaluate the consequences of the decision on future excessive force claims. 
Lastly, Part IV will recommend that the Fourth Circuit more consistently 
consider the case law of other circuits and that the Supreme Court resolve the 
current circuit split on clearly established law and revert back to its earlier 
balance of qualified immunity’s purpose. 
 
 5. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong with Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 859–60 
(2010). 
 6. E.W., 884 F.3d at 179 (“The ultimate ‘question [is] whether the totality of the circumstances 
justified a particular sort of . . . seizure.’” (quoting Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527–28 (4th Cir. 
2003))). 
 7. Id. at 185. 
 8. See infra notes 65–71 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 46–64 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
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I.  WHEN QUALIFIED IMMUNITY MEETS A FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM 
A. Origins of Qualified Immunity 
United States Code § 1983 creates a mechanism by which government 
officials can be held personally liable for money damages for violating the 
constitutional rights of citizens.11 Congress enacted § 1983 during 
Reconstruction in the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act.12 Although the statute, as written 
then and now, makes no mention of any immunity, the Supreme Court 
recognized qualified immunity as a defense based on the “solidly established” 
common law doctrine that shielded judges from liability for “acts committed 
within their judicial jurisdiction.”13 Though the Court failed to clarify how this 
immunity for judges extended to other officials, it concluded that qualified 
immunity protected officials who conducted themselves in good faith with a 
reasonable belief in the legality of their actions.14 
This quasi-subjective standard for qualified immunity did not last long. 
The modern incarnation of qualified immunity stems from Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald,15 which threw out the subjective component.16 To decide whether the 
official’s actions were protected, the Supreme Court created an objective 
reasonableness test that disregards an official’s actual intent.17 In order to bring 
a successful § 1983 claim against a government official, a plaintiff has to prove 
two things: (1) that there was a constitutional violation; and (2) on the qualified 
immunity prong, that the official’s conduct “violate[d] clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”18 
 
 11. Section 1983 provides:  
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured . . . . 
42 U.S.C § 1983 (2018). While § 1983 creates a remedy against state and local officials, Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics allows for similar causes of action based on 
constitutional violations committed by federal officials. 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). 
 12. Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2018)). The provision was initially enacted to provide a civil remedy for abuse committed by the Ku 
Klux Klan in Southern states. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337–38 (1983). 
 13. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967). 
 14. See id. at 557. 
 15. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
 16. Id. at 817–18. Proof of an official’s subjective motive, the Court explained, would have entailed 
intensive discovery. Id. at 817. Additionally, some courts understood subjective motive to be a factual 
question that could only be resolved by a jury, thereby defeating one part of qualified immunity’s 
purpose by needlessly subjecting some officials to the time and costs of trial. See id. at 816–18. 
 17. Id. at 818. 
 18. Id. 
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Clearly established law is now the name of the game for plaintiffs, yet the 
Court has failed to elucidate further—in Harlow and in cases since—what 
“clearly established” actually means.19 In its stead, lower courts have typically 
relied on the existence of precedent to determine if the disputed issue has been 
addressed, either from the U.S. Supreme Court, their own circuit, or, in some 
jurisdictions, from a consensus of other circuits.20 
The new test for qualified immunity seeks to balance the rights of citizens 
with the need to protect officials in their discretionary duties,21 or, in other 
words, to give “government officials breathing room to make reasonable but 
mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”22 Even though the doctrine 
purports to balance those concerns, over time the Supreme Court has chastised 
courts who do not apply the doctrine strictly,23 frequently reversing denials of 
qualified immunity,24 particularly in the context of policing.25 Largely these 
reversals have stemmed from lower courts defining a clearly established right at 
too “high [a] level of generality.”26 But the result of the Supreme Court’s 
pressure weighs heavily on excessive force claims. In turn, when qualified 
immunity is applied to cases brought under the Fourth Amendment, the scales 
are tipped significantly in favor of defendants. 
B. Fourth Amendment Claims Undergo a Similar Reasonableness Approach 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by government officials.27 Though the Fourth Amendment is often 
 
 19. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 272, 277 (2009). 
 20. See John C. Williams, Note, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1312–13 
(2012) (describing the analyses of each circuit and finding that (1) the majority of circuits looked to 
outside case law if no Supreme Court case or its own precedent was on point, (2) some circuits were 
more restrictive but still looked at other case law, and (3) the Eleventh Circuit unequivocally focused 
on binding precedent). 
 21. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807. The Court also identified the social costs that government officials 
face because of civil lawsuits including “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from 
pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.” Id. at 814. 
 22. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). 
 23. See id. at 742 (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a 
high level of generality.”); see also Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam). 
 24. Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 
1798 n.2 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, Case Against] (noting that between 1982 and 2018, the Supreme 
Court had decided thirty-two qualified immunity cases and found violations of clearly established law 
in only two of them). 
 25. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV., 45, 88–90 app. 
(2018). 
 26. See, e.g., Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (explaining that courts must examine an officer’s conduct 
within the “specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition”). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
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asserted in criminal cases to suppress evidence unlawfully obtained,28 it also 
serves as the basis for many civil claims brought against law enforcement under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.29 In fact, the existence of § 1983 as a vehicle for vindicating 
Fourth Amendment violations can often come at the expense of criminal 
defendants.30 When the Supreme Court limits the exclusionary rule, it often 
argues that the reason for the rule—deterrence—is already well served by civil 
remedies like a § 1983 claim.31 
Plaintiffs may assert excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment 
through a § 1983 lawsuit.32 Just as Harlow eliminated the subjective element in 
qualified immunity, Graham v. Connor33 changed the standard for analyzing 
excessive force claims.34 In Graham, a black man went to a convenience store to 
buy orange juice because of an insulin reaction. Over the course of the next 
several hours, police initiated a traffic stop, handcuffed him, violently threw 
him into a police car, and dumped him onto his front yard—all based on a series 
of grave misunderstandings.35 The man suffered a broken foot and several other 
injuries.36 Shortly thereafter, he sued the officers under § 1983 for excessive 
force during the stop.37 
Prior to Graham, lower courts had analyzed excessive force claims under 
Johnson v. Glick,38 which called for the consideration of an officer’s subjective 
motives and whether he was acting with malicious or sadistic intent.39 But the 
Supreme Court flipped the script in a unanimous decision,40 reasoning that 
excessive force claims should be examined under the Fourth Amendment’s 
objective reasonableness standard without regard to an officer’s “underlying 
 
 28. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (establishing that the exclusionary rule applies 
to both the federal government and states). 
 29. See, e.g., E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 177 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 30. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006). 
 31. See id. at 596–97 (holding that violation of the knock-and-announce rule does not require 
suppression of the evidence obtained in the ensuing search). But this deterrence theory presumes that 
§ 1983 claims can indeed deter police officers from unlawful conduct. Id. As this Recent Development 
discusses, qualified immunity may often defeat that purpose by protecting an officer on a civil claim as 
well. See infra Part II. 
 32. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (clarifying that § 1983 claims for excessive 
force should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and not the Due Process Clause). 
 33. 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). 
 34. Id. at 397. 
 35. Id. at 388–89. A police officer witnessed Graham leave the store without buying anything, 
which he thought was suspicious—although Graham later explained the line had been too long. Id. The 
officer initiated an investigatory stop of Graham and his friend, which quickly escalated as more officers 
arrived, and eventually ended after the officers learned from the convenience store that Graham had 
done nothing wrong. Id. at 389. 
 36. Id. at 390. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 39. Id. at 1033; see Graham, 490 U.S. at 393. 
 40. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. 
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intent or motivation.”41 And, importantly, the reasonableness of an officer’s 
actions could only be judged “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on 
the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”42 
Noting that the reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment was not 
capable of “precise definition or mechanical application,”43 the Graham Court 
emphasized the necessity of a careful balancing test that considers the individual 
facts and circumstances of each case.44 Specifically, courts need to consider three 
factors: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”45 Ultimately, 
the case was remanded back to the trial court, and Graham lost.46 
C. A Growing Burden To Find Clearly Established Law 
Although Graham did not address qualified immunity, it helped usher in 
a new era for plaintiffs facing a qualified immunity defense—an era that, so far, 
has presented real challenges for plaintiffs. Fourth Amendment claims under 
Graham are evaluated through a reasonableness test that is inherently fact 
bound;47 one new fact in the equation could completely rewire a case’s ultimate 
outcome.48 But for purposes of defeating qualified immunity, plaintiffs have to 
identify cases sufficiently similar to their own that address the right at issue and 
establish clear law. When a Fourth Amendment case deals with its own 
particularized set of facts, that case may be unhelpful toward creating a clear 
right for a slightly different fact pattern. 
If the Supreme Court has taught us anything about identifying clearly 
established law, it is that specificity is paramount.49 In Mullenix v. Luna,50 the 
Fifth Circuit found that shooting a fleeing motorist in a high-speed pursuit 
 
 41. Id. at 396–97. 
 42. Id. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)). 
 43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). 
The Fourth Amendment has “both the virtue of brevity and the vice of ambiguity.” JACOB W. 
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 42 (1966). 
 44. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 399; Greg Lacour & Emma Way, Why Police ‘Get Away with It’, CHARLOTTE MAG. 
(June 23, 2017), https://www.charlottemagazine.com/why-police-get-away-with-it/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2ANE-3DEH]. 
 47. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 48. See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text. 
 49. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam) (stating that the Court could 
not determine clearly established law because three cases, though similar, all showed that “the result 
depends very much on the facts of each case” and the defendant’s actions fell into a “hazy border 
between excessive and acceptable force” (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001))). 
 50. 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (per curiam). 
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violated a clearly established right,51 but the Supreme Court reversed and 
rebuked the Fifth Circuit for describing the right too broadly.52 Although the 
Fifth Circuit described the officer’s actions as “deadly force against a fleeing 
felon who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others,”53 
the correct inquiry was whether the officer’s conduct was prohibited “in the 
‘situation [she] confronted.’”54 With proper specificity, the analysis should have 
included pivotal facts: “a reportedly intoxicated fugitive, set on avoiding 
capture through high-speed vehicular flight, who twice during his flight had 
threatened to shoot police officers, and who was moments away from 
encountering an officer at Cemetery Road.”55 With those new facts, the case law 
became too muddied to establish a clear rule for the officer to have followed.56 
And if the case law is too murky, a plaintiff like Mullenix cannot use it to 
analogize to his own case and show the law was clearly established. 
The Supreme Court’s push for such specificity in Mullenix is not 
surprising given the defendant-friendly evolution of the Court’s qualified 
immunity jurisprudence. The lone exception is Hope v. Pelzer,57 when the Court 
went to great lengths to explain that clearly established law did not mean a 
plaintiff had to find “fundamentally similar” or even “materially similar” cases.58 
Instead, “the salient question . . . [was] whether the state of the law . . . gave 
[the officers] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was 
unconstitutional.”59 But, over time, the Supreme Court has gradually expanded 
the breadth of the qualified immunity defense through sharpened language and 
additional qualifiers.60 
Much of this traces back to Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,61 when the Supreme Court 
strengthened the doctrine through a subtle change in its language. First, the 
Court explained that qualified immunity protects officials unless the law was 
“‘sufficiently clear’ [such] that every ‘reasonable official would [have 
understood] that what he is doing violates that right.’”62 Previous opinions had 
 
 51. Id. at 308. 
 52. See id. (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high 
level of generality.” (internal quotation marks omitted (omission in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011))). 
 53. Id. at 308–09 (quoting Luna v. Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712, 725 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
 54. Id. at 309 (quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199). 
 55. Id. at 309. 
 56. See id. 
 57. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
 58. Id. at 741. 
 59. Id. (emphasis added). 
 60. See Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. HEADNOTES 62, 65–67 (2016) (noting the defense’s steady growth since Harlow). 
 61. 563 U.S. 731 (2011). 
 62. Id. at 741 (emphasis added) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
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only required a reasonable official, not every single one.63 Second, the Court 
also required that “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 
constitutional question beyond debate.”64 Once again, “beyond debate” was a new 
addition that seemed to further strengthen the doctrine. Indeed, the phrase has 
appeared in the majority of the Court’s qualified immunity cases ever since.65 
The Supreme Court has also been frustratingly opaque in defining “clearly 
established” law. It once posited that courts could look beyond precedent and 
toward “a consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”66 In Hope, for instance, 
the Court even examined an Alabama Department of Corrections regulation 
and a United States Department of Justice report alongside circuit precedent as 
clearly establishing a violation.67 
Recently, however, the Court seems to be backtracking, leaving it unclear 
as to whether persuasive authority is convincing enough—or even whether 
binding circuit authority suffices. In City of San Francisco v. Sheehan,68 the Court 
offered that, “to the extent that a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive 
authority’ could itself clearly establish the federal right respondent alleges, no 
such consensus exists here.”69 And in City of Escondido v. Emmons,70 its most 
recent qualified immunity case, the Court further questioned its precedent by 
“[a]ssuming without deciding that a court of appeals decision may constitute 
clearly established law for purposes of qualified immunity.”71 Given the Court’s 
selective caseload,72 a limitation to purely Supreme Court precedent would be 
devastating to plaintiffs. They would have a much smaller share of Fourth 
Amendment cases to rely upon, thereby rendering it more difficult to find a 
case similar to their own. For now, though, it remains an open question. 
Although the vast majority of the Court’s recent qualified immunity 
decisions have favored the defendant,73 some justices have sounded the alarm 
 
 63. See Kinports, supra note 60, at 65. 
 64. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (emphasis added). 
 65. Kinports, supra note 60, at 66. Kinports also noted how al-Kidd picked up on dicta from a 
previous Supreme Court case, Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), to support its statement that 
qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” 
Kinports, supra note 60, at 66 (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 341). But that language, as used originally, 
intended to show how absolute immunity was not needed to protect law enforcement officers executing 
a warrant without probable cause; there was no indication the Court meant to strengthen the underlying 
qualified immunity doctrine. Id. 
 66. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). 
 67. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741–42 (2002). 
 68. 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015). 
 69. Id. at 1778 (emphasis added) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742). 
 70. 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019) (per curiam). 
 71. Id. at 503 (emphasis added). 
 72. Each term, the Supreme Court hears only eighty cases out of approximately 7000–8000 
petitions for review. The Supreme Court at Work, SUP. CT. U.S., www.supremecourt.gov/about/ 
courtatwork.aspx [https://perma.cc/W5MF-4FGT]. 
 73. See Schwartz, Case Against, supra note 24, at 1798 n.2. 
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against this tightening jurisprudence. In Kisela v. Hughes,74 for example, a police 
officer shot a woman four times who was allegedly “acting erratically” with a 
kitchen knife.75 Justice Sotomayor dissented from the Court’s “disturbing 
trend” in qualified immunity cases of insulating an officer from liability through 
summary reversal of a lower court’s opinion.76 Joined by Justice Ginsberg, she 
argued that the Court’s “one-sided approach . . . transforms the doctrine into 
an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of 
the Fourth Amendment.”77 Notably, in her analysis of clearly established law, 
she cited Supreme Court precedent, Ninth Circuit precedent, and out-of-circuit 
precedent.78 
D. Flaws of Qualified Immunity 
Unsurprisingly, given its frequent effect of immunizing officials despite 
bad behavior, qualified immunity has been the source of significant criticism.79 
In particular, critics have noted the problematic sequencing structure,80 the 
duplication of the reasonableness test,81 and the failure of the doctrine to achieve 
its intended purposes.82 
First, to defeat qualified immunity, plaintiffs likely need a robust 
background of law that is specific to their case. But that might elude them due 
to the Court’s aversion to addressing constitutional questions when another 
ground exists to decide a case.83 For a brief period, the Supreme Court overrode 
the principle of constitutional avoidance by forcing lower courts to address the 
constitutional question prior to qualified immunity.84 First, a court would have 
to ask if there was a constitutional violation.85 Once that question was answered, 
only then could a court decide if the law was clearly established as to that 
 
 74. 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018). 
 75. Id. at 1151. 
 76. Id. at 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1158, 1160–61 (detailing several similar cases, including a Ninth Circuit case denying 
qualified immunity after law enforcement shot a man who had been acting erratically with a machete). 
 79. Some critics even question its constitutionality altogether. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 25. 
 80. See Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 
1790 (2016). 
 81. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 861. 
 82. See Schwartz, Case Against, supra note 24, at 1833. 
 83. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“Considerations of propriety, as well as long-established practice, demand that we refrain from passing 
upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless obliged to do so in the proper performance of 
our judicial function . . . .” (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919))). 
 84. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“A court required to rule upon the qualified 
immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the 
party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? 
This must be the initial inquiry.”). 
 85. Id. 
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violation.86 The Supreme Court reasoned summarily that this battle order was 
needed to allow for “the law’s elaboration from case to case.”87 The more cases 
decided on constitutional grounds, the clearer the law would become for officials 
to follow.88 
However, this approach received significant criticism.89 For one, it 
invoked separation of powers issues.90 Critics argued that courts would have to 
wade into the executive branch’s constitutional powers even though they could 
dismiss the case on another ground.91 Additionally, as Justice Breyer 
emphasized in a concurrence in Brosseau v. Haugen,92 forcing preliminary 
decisions of constitutional law would create unnecessary expenses for the 
judiciary and might result in bad law that was unreviewable by a higher court.93 
Predictably, the Court reversed this sequencing structure less than a decade 
later.94 
Now courts retain discretion as to when to decide constitutional issues.95 
This return to normalcy, however, creates the possibility that some 
constitutional violations will always find protection in qualified immunity 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. 
L. REV. 667, 674–75 (2009) (explaining how the “law-elaboration function” was the justification for 
side-stepping constitutional avoidance). 
 89. See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 
1277 (2006) (“This rule involves so many and such serious problems that I am not sure where to 
begin.”). 
 90. See Leong, supra note 88, at 676–77. 
 91. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 428 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[W]e should also 
adhere to a basic constitutional obligation by avoiding unnecessary decision of constitutional 
questions.”); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 842–43 (2001) (tracing the history of the Court’s constitutional avoidance 
canon as a means of preserving separation of powers). But constitutional avoidance makes less sense in 
the qualified immunity context. The court rules not on the constitutionality of a statute, which might 
engender concern that it is encroaching on legislative powers. Rather, the court rules only on the 
constitutionality of an individual government official’s actions (i.e., the executive branch). See Leong, 
supra note 88, at 677. 
 92. 543 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 93. Id. In Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (2004), Justice Scalia explained the dictum flaw: “Two 
Circuits have noticed that if the constitutional determination remains locked inside a § 1983 suit in 
which the defendant received a favorable judgment on qualified immunity grounds, then ‘government 
defendants, as the prevailing parties, will have no opportunity to appeal for review of the newly 
declared constitutional right in the higher courts.’” Id. at 1024 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (quoting Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 94. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
 95. The concurrence in E.W., of course, wished the majority had avoided the constitutional issue 
because the opinion “significantly extends [its] precedent in a novel and uncertain manner.” E.W. ex 
rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 189 (4th Cir. 2018) (Shedd, J., concurring). Judge Shedd agreed 
with the majority’s qualified immunity determination but disagreed that a constitutional right was 
violated. Id. 
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because a court refuses to address them.96 As one commentator explained, the 
doctrine “creates a silent echo chamber, in which civil rights questions go 
repeatedly unanswered.”97 
Another inherent flaw of qualified immunity is that it duplicates work 
already done in the court’s constitutional analysis. Many critics have 
admonished the one-two punch of the double reasonableness test that Fourth 
Amendment plaintiffs face,98 including several Supreme Court Justices.99 First, 
a plaintiff has to prove an officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.100 Then, even after the officer’s actions have been 
proven as objectively unreasonable, a plaintiff still must show that the officer 
would have known his actions were objectively unreasonable based on the law at 
the time of the incident.101 
Because the objective reasonableness standard in excessive force cases 
encompasses the same concerns that qualified immunity addresses (i.e., was the 
officer reasonable in his actions?), qualified immunity would seem to merge into 
the merits of the excessive force analysis.102 At one time, a majority of circuits 
even believed the two analyses should merge in an excessive force claim.103 
Otherwise, having both doubly insulates an officer from liability.104 The officer 
might act objectively unreasonably—even subjectively unreasonably with bad 
faith or malice—but if his actions are distinct enough not to have been addressed 
by a court before, then he stands immune. 
 
 96. See Colin Rolfs, Qualified Immunity After Pearson v. Callahan, 59 UCLA L. REV. 468, 468 
(2011) (concluding that post-Pearson, circuit courts more often ruled on the immunity prong first 
without addressing the constitutional right prong, but district courts continue to address the 
constitutional right prong first). But see Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Measuring Pearson in the 
Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 640–41 (2011) (finding that Pearson generally did not change 
courts’ behavior in which prong to address first). 
 97. Cover, supra note 80, at 1790. 
 98. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 861 (“If, taking all the limitations on the officer’s time, 
information, and perceptions into account, the officer’s use of force was ‘objectively unreasonable,’ 
arguably there would be no need for an independent inquiry into whether a reasonable officer could 
have believed such conduct to be lawful.”). 
 99. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 216–17 (2001) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that once 
objective reasonableness is met, “there is simply no work for a qualified immunity inquiry to do”); see 
also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 664 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
allowance of a double reasonableness test that counted “the law enforcement interest twice and the 
individual’s privacy interest only once”). 
 100. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204–05. 
 101. See id. at 205. 
 102. Jeffries, supra note 5, at 861. 
 103. See Frazell v. Flanigan, 102 F.3d 877, 886–87 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[O]nce a jury has determined 
under the Fourth Amendment that the officer’s conduct was objectively unreasonable, that conclusion 
necessarily resolves for immunity purposes whether a reasonable officer could have believed that his 
conduct was lawful.”). 
 104. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 659 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Nevertheless, in Saucier v. Katz,105 the Supreme Court rejected criticism 
that the two reasonableness standards are superfluous and explained that the 
first reasonableness test protects officers from mistakes of fact whereas the 
second test protects officers from mistakes of law.106 Thus, any approach seeking 
to rebalance the scales of qualified immunity must eye more modest goals in 
order to find judicial approval at the highest level.107 
Lastly, real-life results simply may not support the core justifications 
behind qualified immunity. The doctrine is meant to protect officials from the 
burdens of extensive discovery and trial. It equips judges with a tool to 
eliminate weak cases before those burdens grow.108 But a recent study suggests 
the vast majority of qualified immunity cases still make it to trial anyway.109 
Furthermore, almost all police officers involved in civil rights claims never pay 
the costs of their defense.110 With no real financial liability at stake, police 
officers do not need qualified immunity’s protection from a lawsuit. So despite 
steadily strengthening the doctrine, the Supreme Court has made little impact 
on the doctrine’s ultimate policy goals. 
Not all commentators agree with this characterization,111 and one could 
argue that the doctrine’s failure to meet its policy goals only underscores why 
the Supreme Court must further strengthen it. But there are numerous reasons 
to reject that conclusion. For one, evidence suggests that qualified immunity 
unfortunately deters people from filing even meritorious claims because of the 
expenses of fighting under the doctrine.112 Second, because of other procedural 
constraints, like a defendant’s high burden at the 12(b)(6) and summary 
judgment stages, qualified immunity may simply be the wrong vehicle to 
dismiss insubstantial claims.113 And finally, further strengthening immunity 
would only aggravate the “silent echo chamber” already at hand: each new, 
slight variation of a constitutional violation would continue to be dismissed 
because there is no “clearly established law” on point. 
 
 105. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 106. See id. at 195. 
 107. But see Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning 
qualified immunity’s evolution from its common law origins and suggesting that the Court “reconsider 
our qualified immunity jurisprudence” in an appropriate case). 
 108. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 817–18 (1982). 
 109. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2017) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, How Qualified]. 
 110. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 890 (2014). 
 111. Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1876 (2018) (raising doubt as to whether Schwartz’s empirical analysis of 
qualified immunity actually warrants a full reconsideration of the doctrine). 
 112. See Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477, 492 
(2011). 
 113. See Schwartz, How Qualified, supra note 109, at 54. 
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All of this, of course, begs the question: If qualified immunity is not 
reaching its goals—and it seems the improper vehicle to reach those goals114—
then why continue to allow it to shield officials from objectively unreasonable 
behavior? As it stands today, qualified immunity is “as if the one-bite rule for 
bad dogs started over with every change in weather conditions.”115 
II.  BACKGROUND OF E.W. 
E.W. was ten years old when she got into a kicking and shoving match 
with another female student on a school bus.116 As a result, she was suspended 
from the bus for three days, but there were no further incidents between the 
girls.117 Three days after the scuffle, a school resource officer118 and two school 
officials called E.W. into an office and questioned her about the incident.119 
E.W. responded calmly and was compliant but did not seem remorseful to the 
officer.120 Because of this, the officer handcuffed the four-feet, four-inches tall, 
ninety-five-pound girl for two minutes, allegedly out of fear for the physical 
safety of the larger adults in the room,121 even though E.W. had no prior 
behavioral issues.122 
The Fourth Circuit found that the handcuffing alone, even without 
physical injury to E.W., violated her constitutional rights123: “[The officer] took 
a situation where there was no need for any physical force and used 
unreasonable force disproportionate to the circumstances presented.”124 When 
 
 114. See Schwartz, Case Against, supra note 24, at 1799, 1833–35 (concluding that if qualified 
immunity is not overruled, the Supreme Court should at least incorporate the subjective test again or 
consider the policy goals in individual cases and that lower courts should more heavily rely on Hope). 
 115. John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 256 (2013). 
 116. E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 176 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 117. Id. at 177, 181. 
 118. The officer, Rosemary Dolgos, was a deputy sheriff in Wicomico County in Maryland. Id. “A 
school resource officer, by federal definition, is a career law enforcement officer with sworn authority 
who is deployed by an employing police department or agency in a community-oriented policing 
assignment to work in collaboration with one or more schools.” Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N 
SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, https://nasro.org/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/JR2L-
DCP3]. Accordingly, like other governmental officials, state or local, their official actions may be 
protected by qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). 
 119. E.W., 884 F.3d at 177. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. The source of the officer’s concern was allegedly both “the incident [the officer] observed 
in the surveillance video and E.W.’s apathy.” Id. 
 122. Id. at 181. The court discusses E.W.’s lack of disciplinary history in its analysis, but this factor 
may run afoul of the objective reasonableness test, which inquires what the officer knew at the time of 
the seizure and not with 20/20 hindsight. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Here, the 
officer had no knowledge of E.W.’s disciplinary background. E.W., 884 F.3d at 177. Therefore, it 
should not be considered in the excessive force claim. 
 123. E.W., 884 F.3d at 185. The court rejected a rule that handcuffing was per se reasonable. Id. at 
180 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1985) (holding that probable cause to arrest does not 
automatically justify the manner in which search or seizure is conducted)). 
 124. Id. at 185. 
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viewed through Graham’s objective reasonableness lens,125 the officer’s actions 
were not justified because the majority of the Graham factors weighed in favor 
of E.W.126 The first—“the severity of the crime at issue”127—weighed against 
E.W. because an assault, even a minor one like this, constituted a violent 
offense.128 The second—“whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the 
safety of the officers or others”129—strongly favored E.W., who was a foot 
shorter and sixty pounds lighter than the officer, and also was surrounded by 
three adults.130 Moreover, significant time had elapsed between the fight and 
the questioning with no escalation.131 And the final factor—“whether [s]he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight”132—also favored 
E.W., because there was no evidence she was attempting to flee or resist.133 
The court also weaved additional factors into the traditional Graham 
fabric, including E.W.’s age and the school setting.134 Those factors, the court 
explained, were relevant in shifting the analysis from what would be appropriate 
in a street-policing scenario to what would be appropriate at a school, where 
uses of force could undermine a student’s willingness to attend and effectively 
learn.135 Notably, the court supported its use of these elements by noting their 
inclusion in the analyses of other circuit courts, while also citing reported and 
unreported district court opinions.136 
Interestingly, while the Fourth Circuit summarily stated that Graham 
applied, it remains an open question whether Graham applies to excessive force 
cases in school settings, or if another case about school searches, New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.,137 controls.138 T.L.O. held that Fourth Amendment protections in 
schools hinge on additional considerations unique to a school, such as the need 
for school personnel to maintain order and discipline in the classroom.139 Hence, 
 
 125. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. 
 126. E.W., 884 F.3d at 179–80 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
 127. Id. at 179. 
 128. Id. at 180. But the court noted this factor was “tempered” because the assault was only a 
misdemeanor. Id. 
 129. Id. at 179 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
 130. Id. at 181. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 179 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
 133. Id. at 181–82. 
 134. Id. at 179, 182–83. 
 135. See id. at 183–84; see also Alexis Karteron, Arrested Development: Rethinking Fourth Amendment 
Standards for Seizures and Uses of Force in Schools, 18 NEV. L.J. 863, 880 (2018) (recommending that 
higher consideration of the school context be included in the excessive force analysis because of the 
heightened trauma students experience during the use of force and arrests in schools). 
 136. E.W., 884 F.3d at 182–83. 
 137. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 138. See Karteron, supra note 135, at 868–69. 
 139. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339. In some cases, “the school setting requires some easing of the 
restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject.” Id. at 340. But the Court 
noted in a subsequent school search case that “the nature of [a child’s constitutional rights] is what is 
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a court might conclude that those considerations should underpin an excessive 
force claim in a school as well. Some circuits have extended T.L.O. in varying 
degrees to excessive force claims in school,140 while others have not.141 Those 
that have not and, instead, continue to apply Graham, do not always include the 
school setting or age of a student as relevant factors in their analyses.142 
Regardless, once E.W. established that her constitutional rights had been 
violated, E.W. still had to show the officer’s actions violated clearly established 
law.143 While Graham requires officers to measure force against the 
aforementioned factors, Graham is “cast at a high level of generality”—too high 
to provide notice to a reasonable officer that he is behaving 
unconstitutionally.144 In other words, E.W. needed to find a factually analogous 
case because Graham only gave the general framework of how a law enforcement 
officer should measure his actions.145 The court opined that Fourth Amendment 
cases, in particular, require a “high level of specificity because ‘it is sometimes 
difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will 
apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.’”146 
In its search for controlling authority, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
specific facts in E.W. did not have to be previously decided.147 Yet, inevitably, 
the court hunted for just that—matching facts—and found nothing.148 Unlike 
its Fourth Amendment analysis, the court limited its search for authority only 
to cases within its own circuit or from the Supreme Court.149 Without a similar 
case, the court found the officer had no notice of the right at issue and was 
therefore protected from suit under qualified immunity.150 But the court 
emphasized that its excessive force holding applied to future cases “involving 
 
appropriate for children in school.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–56 (1995) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the age and sex of a student is an important factor in a Fourth 
Amendment search claim in school. See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (“Such a search will be permissible 
in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”). 
 140. See C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citing and 
applying the T.L.O. test but not relying on it exclusively); Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 
1295, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2006) (directly applying T.L.O.). 
 141. E.W., 884 F.3d at 179; see A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1151 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 142. See A.M., 830 F.3d at 1151–52 (describing Graham factors without mention of the age, sex, or 
school setting of the student, though it ultimately determined the case solely on the qualified immunity 
prong). 
 143. E.W., 884 F.3d at 185. 
 144. Id. at 186 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). 
 145. See id. 
 146. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001)). 
 147. Id. at 185 (“It is not required, however, that a court previously found the specific conduct at 
issue to have violated an individual’s right[] [so long as t]he unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct [is] 
‘manifestly apparent’ . . . .” (quoting Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 279 (4th Cir. 2004))). 
 148. See id. at 186–87. 
 149. See id. at 186. 
 150. Id. at 186–87. 
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similar circumstances.”151 Ironically, “similar circumstances” may be the death 
knell of future litigants hoping to rely on E.W. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES OF E.W. FOR SIMILAR LITIGANTS 
Aware of the drought of relevant authority and seeking to establish a 
constitutional right for future litigants, the E.W. court wisely addressed the 
case’s constitutional issue head-on.152 Despite that willingness, questions remain 
about the breadth of the decision and how it might unfold in future qualified 
immunity cases. The court’s declaration that the “excessive force holding is 
clearly established for any future qualified immunity cases involving similar 
circumstances” leaves a lot of ground to be covered.153 As the concurrence 
pointed out, the exact parameters of the majority’s holding are left unclear.154 
Does the majority intend only to establish the violation of “handcuff[ing] an 
arrested juvenile at school simply to punish or teach him a lesson” or is it 
“opening the door to permit all custodial arrestees to pursue . . . excessive force 
claims based on the mere fact that they were handcuffed”?155 
To be sure, it may be difficult to create a broad right based on a particular 
set of facts. In Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst,156 the 
Fourth Circuit considered a case where police officers tasered a mentally 
disabled man who was acting bizarrely and had wrapped himself around a traffic 
pole.157 The court found the tasering unconstitutional and explained that, “a 
police officer may only use serious injurious force, like a taser, when an 
objectively reasonable officer would conclude that the circumstances present a 
risk of immediate danger that could be mitigated by the use of force.”158 This is 
broad language, but because of the unique situation,159 Armstrong likely will not 
set clear law for the use of tasers, or similar weapons, in cases with less colorful 
facts. 
After all, the Fourth Circuit has previously hitched itself tightly to the 
requirement for specificity in case law.160 In Fields v. Prater,161 the plaintiff sued 
for denial of employment for a social services position based on her political 
 
 151. Id. at 187. 
 152. See id. at 178–79. 
 153. Id. at 187. 
 154. Id. at 198 (Shedd, J., concurring). 
 155. Id. 
 156. 810 F.3d 892 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 157. Id. at 896–97. 
 158. Id. at 905. 
 159. The man was subject to an involuntary civil commitment order. Id. at 896. When police 
arrived at the scene, he was walking across an active roadway. Id. Once off the road, he continued to 
act oddly by eating grass and dandelions and putting cigarettes out on his tongue. Id.  
 160. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 857–58. 
 161. 566 F.3d 381 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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affiliation.162 In the plaintiff’s corner was (1) a state social services handbook 
that prohibited consideration of political affiliation for employment decisions163 
and (2) a previous Fourth Circuit opinion holding that electoral boards could 
not consider political affiliation in county registrar appointments.164 Yet, instead 
of relying on these factors, the Fourth Circuit found that no clearly established 
authority existed and granted qualified immunity,165 despite the obvious 
intuition that the defendant’s actions were both patently unreasonable and 
violative of internal policy. 
Confusion will follow E.W. as to whether the right addressed is a broad 
one—entailing a person’s right not to be handcuffed—or if further delineation 
is required. If intended to extend to all handcuffing, the Supreme Court will 
certainly reject the decision as creating clearly established law, unless the 
underlying facts are virtually identical. As Judge Shedd’s concurrence in E.W. 
emphasized, at least six federal circuit courts have rejected the notion that 
handcuffing alone, without any injuries, qualifies as excessive force.166 Indeed, 
the Fourth Circuit itself proclaimed in Brown v. Gilmore167 that “a standard 
procedure such as handcuffing would rarely constitute excessive force where the 
officers were justified . . . in effecting the underlying arrest.”168 Thus, despite 
Judge Shedd’s concern that E.W. opens the door “to permit all custodial 
arrestees to pursue . . . excessive force claims based on the mere fact that they 
were handcuffed,”169 that concern is misplaced once the single thread of E.W. is 
considered within the entire tapestry of handcuffing cases. Clearly, the core 
facts matter. 
What may be more difficult to discern is whether the court has established 
a more particularized right against handcuffing juveniles at school or against 
handcuffing purely for disciplinary reasons. The latter distinction might be 
unimportant because the court’s reasonableness analysis does not delve into the 
officer’s subjective reasons for seizing an individual.170 Exactly why the specific 
officer holds a person is irrelevant, as long as a reasonable officer would have 
done the same.171 The former right—against handcuffing certain juveniles at 
school—again seems too broadly defined to meet the Supreme Court’s 
specificity requirements. But as the right is defined more narrowly, the more 
 
 162. Id. at 383. Although Fields is a First Amendment case, the same issue of clearly established 
law applies to it as well. Id. 
 163. Id. at 388. 
 164. Id. at 389–90. 
 165. Id. at 389; see also Jeffries, supra note 5, at 857–58. 
 166. E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 193–94 (4th Cir. 2018) (Shedd, J., concurring). 
 167. 278 F.3d 362 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 168. Id. at 369. 
 169. E.W., 884 F.3d at 198 (Shedd, J., concurring). 
 170. See id. at 179 (majority opinion). 
 171. See id. 
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difficult it becomes to create useful precedent for qualified immunity 
purposes.172 For example, it would be unhelpful to future plaintiffs that the 
clearly established right against handcuffing specifically applies to compliant, 
ninety-pound, ten-year-old girls surrounded by three adults following a fight 
with another child on a bus several days prior. 
Even though that level of specificity dilutes the usefulness of the right for 
later litigants, those specifics are at the heart of the right in question. The E.W. 
decision turned on several factors, each playing a significant role. The court in 
E.W. hints that had the fight occurred the same day or involved violence against 
an authority figure rather than a student, the handcuffing may have been 
reasonable.173 Broadly defining the constitutional right in E.W. may unshackle 
that right from its underlying rationale—at least under the Supreme Court’s 
current qualified immunity jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court has shown 
time and time again, it will not accept broad proclamations of constitutional 
rights—rather, the individual facts rule.174 
The E.W. court repeatedly emphasized that a specific set of facts need not 
have been decided previously,175 but in the context of excessive force claims, that 
does not offer a generous amount of help when most determinations of 
constitutional rights hinge on a particular fact. As such, future litigants hoping 
to rely on E.W. should be careful not to characterize too broadly in defining the 
constitutional right established in E.W. They should also be wary of defining 
the right in E.W. too narrowly, such that it loses any relevance to their own 
claim entirely. For now, the law that seems most clearly established by E.W. is 
a narrow one—that an officer may not handcuff a compliant, young student who 
poses no safety threat to those around her for a disciplinary incident that 
occurred several days prior.176 Change a single factor in that equation, though, 
and the law becomes hazier. 
IV.  ADJUSTING THE SCALES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
Without adjustments in the Fourth Circuit’s analysis, qualified immunity 
appears doomed to render Fourth Amendment protections hollow.177 Lacking a 
prior case with functionally identical circumstances in the relevant jurisdiction, 
 
 172. Jeffries, supra note 5, at 859. 
 173. See E.W., 884 F.3d at 183 n.5. 
 174. See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
 175. E.W., 884 F.3d at 185. 
 176. Indeed, that is essentially how the Eighth Circuit recognized the right contemplated in E.W. 
before finding that it did not create a clearly established right for a noncompliant second grader who 
was screaming and attempting to run away before being handcuffed in K.W.P. v. Kansas City Public 
Schools, 931 F.3d 813, 816–18, 823 (8th Cir. 2019). 
 177. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing the 
Court had adopted a “shoot first, think later” approach to policing). 
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a plaintiff can suffer an endless trove of abuses under the Fourth Amendment 
with zero legal recourse. 
But what measures could the Fourth Circuit reasonably take to fix the 
issue? And at what point does the Supreme Court need to step in and address 
the matter?178 E.W. illustrates two functional challenges faced by Fourth 
Amendment plaintiffs when trying to reach the clearly established law standard: 
(1) where a court may venture to find clearly established law and (2) the level 
of factual analogy required to create clearly established law addressing the 
conduct in question. The former issue could and should be addressed by the 
Fourth Circuit, but it also represents a split among jurisdictions, which should 
ultimately be taken up by the Supreme Court. The latter issue, however, might 
only be fixable by the Supreme Court. 
The clearest path for established law issues has already been carved by 
other circuits beyond the Fourth. Here, E.W. may have defeated the officer’s 
qualified immunity defense had the Fourth Circuit modified its search for 
clearly established law. While the Fourth Circuit appeared to only look 
inwardly for precedent,179 six other circuits typically expand their search to 
include consensuses outside of their borders.180 If the Fourth Circuit had looked 
outwardly, the court would have found two relevant decisions from the Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuits, which both found unconstitutional uses of force when 
officers handcuffed compliant children who posed no safety threat at school.181 
These decisions were acknowledged by the E.W. court in its Fourth 
Amendment analysis,182 but not when the court moved onto qualified immunity. 
 
 178. This Recent Development proposes a judicial remedy rather than a statutory remedy as the 
appropriate vehicle for change. Though qualified immunity seems to be largely a statutory precedent, 
the Supreme Court has frequently tinkered with it. See Baude, supra note 25, at 80–82 (examining the 
“unorthodox” nature of qualified immunity as a statutory precedent and noting the Court’s changes to 
the sequencing order and the elimination of the subjective requirement). These changes “suggest that 
the Court takes more ownership of it than more orthodox statutory doctrines” and would be able to 
“cut back on some of the excesses of qualified immunity.” Id. at 81–82. 
 179. See E.W., 884 F.3d at 186. 
 180. See Jeffries, supra note 5, at 859 (identifying the First, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits as courts that analyze other circuit authority). 
 181. See C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1030 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (finding excessive 
force when a compliant but nonresponsive eleven-year-old who posed no safety threat was handcuffed 
on a playground, even while he was surrounded by four or five adults); see also Gray ex rel. Alexander 
v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1300–01, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that handcuffing a nine-year-old for 
five minutes after she physically threatened a teacher was “excessively intrusive”). Another relevant 
case might have been Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001), which involved a seventh grader 
who was handcuffed at school after becoming argumentative and combative with the school principal. 
Id. at 505–06. The Sixth Circuit ultimately found that this was not a constitutional violation based on 
a per se handcuffing rule. Id. at 508 (“This court's opinion in Kain v. Nesbitt, 156 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 
1998), supports our view that the handcuffing of a person in the course of an otherwise lawful arrest 
fails, as a matter of law, to state a claim for excessive force.”). 
 182. See E.W., 884 F.3d at 182. 
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Confusingly enough, the Fourth Circuit previously has indicated it may 
consider authority from other circuits as persuasive in its case law review.183 
Indeed, several months after E.W. was decided, a different panel analyzed other 
circuits’ case law, although it too granted qualified immunity.184 So what gives 
here? Perhaps the court deemed the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit cases together 
as simply not enough to create “clearly established law.”185 But failing to 
mention them at all in its qualified immunity analysis suggests they were never 
even potentially relevant to the court’s decision. Considering the baseline 
obviousness of the right violated, though—the child’s right not to be handcuffed 
when she poses no threat—one might expect the magic number of cases to create 
“clearly established law” would be fairly low. 
In the future, the Fourth Circuit should not cabin its search of law based 
on arbitrary geographical barriers. And most importantly, the Supreme Court 
should definitively resolve the split in the remaining jurisdictions and declare 
conclusively that clearly established law can originate from jurisdictions around 
the country, thereby avoiding the serious dilemma where actions violate federal 
law in one state but not in another. 
Critics might argue that expanding the parameters of clearly established 
law would overly burden law enforcement officers to keep track of minute legal 
updates from around the country and unfairly punish them in borderline 
cases.186 But it seems unlikely that law enforcement officers parse through their 
own circuit’s case law and recognize the subtle developments that might affect 
them. For broad developments, this might be a fair expectation, but Fourth 
Amendment challenges, as discussed above, are not often written in black letter 
law.187 Considering lawyers attend law school for three years to understand the 
complexities and reasoning of cases, it is fanciful to believe that officers have 
 
 183. Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 184. Wilson v. Prince George’s Cty., 893 F.3d 213, 223 (4th Cir. 2018) (“A survey of other circuits’ 
case law also illustrates the lack of clear consensus regarding violations of this nature.”). 
 185. Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, 911 F.3d 674, 705–06 (4th Cir. 2018) (granting qualified 
immunity even though three other circuits had clearly established law on the right at issue). Feminist 
Majority arguably dealt with a more complex right than at issue here—“the general right of a student 
to be free from a school administrator’s deliberate indifference to student-on-student sexual 
harassment”—but it raises the additional issue of not only where courts can look for established law 
but also how many cases must be on point. Id. 
 186. See Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 
483 U.S. 635, 639–40 (1987)) (explaining that under qualified immunity “[o]fficials are not liable for 
bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines”). 
 187. See Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Comment, Making the “Law of the Land” the Law on the Street: 
How Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295, 328–29 (2000) 
(examining how Fourth Amendment law is taught in several Atlanta-area police academies and noting 
that police officers were “much better able to work with specific, clearly-delineated policies than with 
vague exhortations to consider all the circumstances”). 
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adequate training to comprehend the perforations of every Fourth Amendment 
decision ordered by a court, regardless of where it originates.188 
Additionally, the failure of the E.W. court to venture outside of its own 
precedent to evaluate qualified immunity is inconsistent with its use of outside 
authority to analyze a Fourth Amendment violation generally.189 When the 
E.W. court added the age and school-setting elements to the traditional Graham 
factors to determine excessive force, the court specifically cited the prevailing 
practices of other courts around the country.190 If the positions of other circuits 
helped define reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, why should their 
logic not extend to an almost identical reasonableness analysis under qualified 
immunity? The concern again seems to harken back to giving officers reasonable 
notice of the law that governs their actions. But that justification begins to lose 
its sheen when one remembers that officers are already on their second bite of 
the reasonableness apple. Even if qualified immunity is denied, the plaintiff 
still has to prove the officer acted unreasonably in the moment, a high burden 
on its own. 
Ultimately, if the Fourth Amendment is to have any teeth at all in a § 1983 
claim, then the Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit split and 
clarify that clearly established law can originate outside of binding authority. 
But that alone will not solve the “kudzu-like creep of the modern immunity 
regime.”191 
Today’s qualified immunity jurisprudence unfairly demands precision-
point specificity. While the Supreme Court once described a fair warning 
standard in Hope,192 it has long since left that notion in the dust, instead 
requiring that “every . . . official” be aware of a right “beyond debate.”193 To 
 
 188. See William C. Heffernan & Richard W. Lovely, Evaluating the Fourth Amendment 
Exclusionary Rule: The Problem of Police Compliance with the Law, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 311, 346–
48 (1991) (studying the effects of the exclusionary rule on law enforcement officers and finding that 
over a third of law enforcement officers are mistaken about search and seizure law); L. Timothy Perrin 
et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 682 (1998) 
(showing that police officers who took a test on search and seizure law were only right on slightly more 
than fifty percent of the questions). 
 189. See E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 186 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 190. Id. at 182–83. The court referenced the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as several 
U.S. District Courts, including the Eastern District of Kentucky, the Middle District of Tennessee, 
the District of Maryland, and the Northern District of Ohio. Id. 
 191. Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett, J., concurring), withdrawn on 
reh’g, 928 F.3d 457 (2019). Judge Willett originally concurred with the majority opinion finding a 
constitutional violation but no clearly established law when the Texas Medical Board executed a 
warrantless subpoena on a doctor’s office. Id. at 487, 498. On rehearing, Judge Willett, in dissent, found 
there was clearly established law but again criticized the “legal deus ex machina” of qualified immunity. 
Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 478–79 (2019) (Willett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 192. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–40 (2002). 
 193. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). 
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regain the balance it once sought in Harlow, the Court must again adjust the 
scales. 
If not, even a case like E.W. that purports to create a clear constitutional 
right to prevent invasions into the bodily autonomy of harmless children might 
fail to meet even that mark. How many other ways could the facts unfold in 
cases after E.W. that might reach toward the same right, even if abstract, but be 
too distinct factually to find clear authority under the Supreme Court’s current 
requirements? Next time, a child could be placed in a police car instead of 
handcuffed; she might be frisked by an officer at school several days after the 
underlying incident; or she might be arguing in a room with just one official 
before the seizure; or, outside the school context entirely, as an innocent 
bystander in a rowdy situation. 
Each action seemingly invokes the same issue in E.W., but at a level of 
abstraction—namely no immediate danger posed by a child but an intrusion on 
that child’s bodily autonomy by the officer nonetheless. But the exact type of 
intrusion, the lead-up, or the location is different. Each situation then, if 
presented before a court today, might lead to a finding of a constitutional 
violation but not create clearly established law for the others on the list because 
the violative nature of the particular conduct does not establish clear enough 
rules for the others. 
Such a result would seem absurd and would allow officers to act 
unreasonably in known murky areas without punishment. A return to more 
abstraction and the “fair warning” standard that Hope envisioned is necessary. 
Fair warning rather than heightened specificity would ensure that an officer, 
once notified that the law forbids a general set of actions, would not escape 
liability purely because the exact specifics of that officer’s actions and the 
surrounding circumstances were unaddressed. 
Take E.W.’s case as a way to understand how the fair warning standard 
might operate. First, with the Fourth Circuit’s borders open to outside case law, 
the school resource officer would have been on notice of two decisions relatively 
on point in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.194 Both cases found constitutional 
violations when officers handcuffed compliant schoolchildren.195 But when 
examined more specifically under the Supreme Court’s current approach, the 
other circuits’ cases somewhat differ from E.W. In the Ninth and Eleventh 
circuit cases, neither child had engaged in any physical violence prior to the 
handcuffing; one had argued with a principal196 and the other had simply been 
unresponsive because of medication issues.197 
 
 194. See C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1030 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Gray ex rel. 
Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1300–01, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 195. See C.B., 769 F.3d at 1030; Gray, 458 F.3d at 1306. 
 196. Gray, 458 F.3d at 1300–01. 
 197. C.B., 769 F.3d at 1010–11. 
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Yet under Hope’s fair warning standard, those small factual deviations 
would not render the cases irrelevant to E.W.’s claim. A case need not be 
“materially similar” or “fundamentally similar” under Hope.198 Instead, an 
officer need only have fair warning that his actions would be unconstitutional. 
And here, rather than be shielded by the differences in those two cases, the 
officer would be fairly warned of the similarities—that small children who do 
not pose a physical threat to anyone’s safety should not be handcuffed. Thus, 
qualified immunity’s second round of reasonableness would not have protected 
the officer’s decision to handcuff E.W. 
CONCLUSION 
Handcuffing a ten-year-old girl who currently presents no threat is a 
seemingly bizarre choice for a police officer to make. So bizarre, in fact, that 
E.W. had very little law to rely on when the officer later raised qualified 
immunity as a defense to her lawsuit. Qualified immunity was never meant to 
protect the idiosyncratic choices of law enforcement when they violate a 
person’s constitutional rights. Yet with the Supreme Court’s vigorous 
enforcement of specificity in establishing clear law combined with the Fourth 
Circuit’s inconsistency as to what is sufficiently precedential, plaintiffs are 
drafted into a hazy, unwinnable battle. 
Larger grievances concerning qualified immunity may be outside the 
Fourth Circuit’s purview, but the court should more consistently decide from 
where clearly established law may originate. And the Supreme Court, for its 
part, should finally resolve the split about the sources of clearly established law 
and reverse some of its more exacting specificity requirements. No longer 
should jurisdictional lines define where constitutional rights are “clearly 
established” or not; no longer should “a change in the weather conditions” 
change the reasonableness of a police officer’s actions. With a rebalancing of the 
scales, the Fourth Amendment can get back in the ring. 
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